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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
ONE HUNDRED YEARS LATER:
NEW YORK STANDS FIRM
AS THE WORLD AND LAW
AROUND IT CHANGE
A century has passed since Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis triggered the slow but inexorable evolution of the legal
concept of privacy' with their seminal law review article, The
' See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (6th ed. 1990). The right to privacy is the right to
be let alone, to be free of unwarranted publicity, and to withhold one's self from public
scrutiny. Id. Any reference to the "concept of privacy," however, necessarily risks suggesting
that a fully satisfactory definition of that concept has been or could be formulated. Despite
elaborate attempts to reduce the concept of privacy to words, the doctrine of privacy has
been left inadequately defined. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) [hereinafter
WESTIN].
Although the exact parameters of this right are uncleartlthere have been many attempts
to formulate a definition. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(right to shield intimate activities and have freedom from unremitting assaults of world so
as to find peace of mind), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); OFFICE
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH 8-9 (1967) (right of individual to determine which of his beliefs are disclosed to
others); WESTIN, supra ("the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others"); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) ("the extent
to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and
the extent to which we are the subject of others' attention").
By far the most widely accepted definition of the concept of privacy is the one ad-
vanced by William Prosser. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 passim (1960). For
Prosser, the concept of privacy was not a single concept at all but an amalgamation of four
distinct torts:
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion[s] of four differ-
ent interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but
otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interfer-
ence with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, "to be
let alone" (footnote omitted) (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). Without any attempt to exact definition, these four torts
may be described as follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness.
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Right to Privacy.2 Warren and Brandeis argued that social, eco-
Id. at 389. Prosser's conceptualization was incorporated nearly verbatim into the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts and, as a result, has had a profound impact on the framework
within which the concept of privacy is discussed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652A (1976).
2 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter
Warren & Brandeis, Privacy]. The Warren and Brandeis collaboration is widely considered
the most famous and influential law review article of all time. See P. DIONISOPOULOS & C.
DUCAT, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 20 (1976); W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEErON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
& KEETON]; Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to Privacy'", 4 S.D.L. REV. 1, 3 (1959);
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 327 (1966); Note, Hall v. Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of Invasion of
Privacy by Truthful Publication of Embarrassing Facts, 67 N.C.L. REV. 1474, 1478 (1989).
Not all commentators, however, have taken a favorable view of the Warren and Bran-
deis article. See D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 41 (1972); Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875, 875
(1979); Kalven, supra, at 327, 328.
The concept of privacy had been recognized in various forms in the Hebrew, Roman,
Greek, French, and German cultures prior to the Warren and Brandeis article. See S. HOF-
STADTER & G. HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 9-11 (1964); J.T. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS
OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.2, at 1-7 (1990). However, the concept was virtually unknown
in the United States and England. See D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5
(1979). Prior to the Warren and Brandeis article, no court in England or the United States
had granted relief expressly based on the theory of invasion of privacy. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra, § 117, at 849. The Warren and Brandeis article, however, quickly brought the con-
cept of privacy to the forefront of American jurisprudence, inciting a minor revolution in the
development of the common law. See Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell
to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 296-99 (1983). Once War-
ren and Brandeis had broken the silence on the topic of privacy, the legal periodicals
quickly began to fill with commentaries on the subject, See, e.g., Hadley, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 3 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1894); Note, The Right to Privacy-The Schuyler Injunction, 9
HARV. L. REV. 354 (1895); Note, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L. REV. 148 (1891). See
generally Savell, Right of Privacy-Appropriation of a Person's Name, Portrait, or Picture
for Advertising or Trade Purposes Without Prior Written Consent: History and Scope in
New York, 48 ALa. L. REV. 1, 5-6 nn.19-21 (1983) (treatment of early commentary sparked
by Warren and Brandeis article).
Despite the excitement the Warren and Brandeis article generated in the legal periodi-
cals, actual judicial consideration of the concept of a right to privacy developed rather
slowly. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 731 (1937) (writing nearly 50
years after publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, author concluded right of pri-
vacy had almost completely failed to find acceptance); Prosser, supra note 1, at 384 (Warren
and Brandeis article had little immediate impact upon judicial community).
It took nearly 12 years for the concept to come squarely before the court of last resort
of any state in the country. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 543-
44, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902); see also infra notes 11-17, 37-46 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Roberson). It took three more years before a state court of last resort gave the con-
cept its blessing. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 193-94, 50 S.E. 68,
80-81 (1905). By the late 1930's, however, recognition of the concept in the First Restate-
ment of Torts provided substantial momentum to the trend toward acceptance of the doc-
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nomic and political changes were causing increasingly outrageous
assaults on "sacred precincts of private and domestic life"' and
that these invasions mandated the common law's recognition of an
independent principle of the "inviolate personality."4 Just as the
law had advanced gradually from its origins in protecting life and
property toward a recognition of the less immediate but still fun-
damental need to protect man's feelings and intellect,5 Warren and
Brandeis asserted that the common law, with its "beautiful capac-
ity for growth,"' was being challenged to adapt and provide, for
the first time, the legal weaponry with which an individual could
repel these assaults upon his "retreat from the world."' 7 The con-
ceptual seed for this right to be let alone,8 sown by the Warren and
Brandeis collaboration, at first appeared to have found fertile soil
in the New York courts,9 which provided part of the foundation
trine. PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 117, at 851. Today, the concept is recognized to varying
degrees in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States. Id.
' Warren & Brandeis, Privacy, supra note 2, at 195.
" Id. at 205. "Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual
what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone."' Id. at 195 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
Of all the political, social and economic changes of that time, the one development most
responsible for providing the impetus for the landmark article was the rise of "yellow jour-
nalism" in which the press indulged in numerous excesses, including focusing considerable
attention on society's bastions of wealth and power. See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S
LIFE 70 (1946). The development particularly irritated Warren, who married into a promi-
nent Boston family and had experienced firsthand some of the fourth estate's prying ways.
Id. This sentiment was reflected in the Warren and Brandeis article where it was stated:
"The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of de-
cency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery." Warren & Brandeis, Privacy,
supra note 2, at 196. Some commentators have traced this outrage to a particularly souring
experience they claim Warren had concerning the press coverage given his daughter's wed-
ding. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 383. This account, however, has been debunked rather
authoritatively. See Barron, supra note 2, at 891-97.
5 See Warren & Brandeis, Privacy, supra note 2, at 193-95.
Id. at 195.
7 Id. at 195-96.
8 Id. at 195. When Judge Thomas Cooley coined the term "the right to be let alone," he
was referring to the right to be free from physical assaults. See T. COOLEY, supra note 4.
See Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 447, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (1895) (court passed up
opportunity to reject common-law right to privacy and, instead, commented that any pri-
vacy rights one might have had during life terminated upon death); see also Marks v. Jaffa,
6 Misc. 290, 291-92, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (N.Y.C. Super. Ct. N.Y. County 1893) (newspaper
barred from publishing unauthorized photograph of plaintiff as part of popularity contest);
Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. 402, 402, 18 N.Y.S. 240, 240 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1891) (court enjoined unauthorized use of physician's name on adver-
tisement for medicine).
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upon which the authors erected their new legal doctrine.' Any
prospect that the right to privacy would take root and flourish in
New York, however, was unequivocally dashed twelve years after
the article's publication when the New York Court of Appeals, in
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.," became the first state
court of last resort to consider directly the validity of the Warren-
Brandeis thesis.
In Roberson, the court addressed the now-legendary travails of
Abigail Roberson and her claim for invasion of privacy stemming
from a flour mill's unauthorized use of her photograph in a widely
circulated advertisement. 2 Noting the absence of precedent,"
wary of a flood of litigation,14 and conscious of the potential con-
flicts between the first amendment and privacy rights, 15 the court
dismissed Warren and Brandeis's "clever article"' 6 and concluded
that the "so-called 'right of privacy' has not as yet found an abid-
ing place in our jurisprudence, and.., the doctrine cannot now be
incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by
which the profession and the public have long been guided.""
'0 See Manola v. Stevens & Myers (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1890) (unreported decision),
cited in Warren & Brandeis, Privacy, supra note 2, at 195 n.7 (publication of unauthorized
photograph of actress performing in tights prohibited); Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer 379, 384
(1855), cited in Warren & Brandeis, Privacy, supra note 2, at 200 n.3 (publication of private
letter was infringement on writer's right to control).
11 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
12 Id. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442. The defendant circulated an estimated 25,000 copies of the
advertisement featuring Roberson's portrait and the slogan, "Flour of the Family." Id. The
slogan was designed to suggest that just as Miss Roberson was the finest flower of them all,
so too was the defendant's product the best flour. S. HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN NEW YORK 10 (1954). The slogan may also have had something of a
double entendre. See J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.4, at 1-14.
-The advertisement was prominently displayed in and around the plaintiff's hometown
and she contended that as a result she was subjected to humiliating scoffs and jeers. Rober-
son, 171 N.Y. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442. Roberson claimed to have suffered physical and mental
distress as a result of the invasion of her privacy, which ultimately required medical atten-
tion. Id. at 542-43, 64 N.E. 442.
"' Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 543-47, 64 N.E. at 443-44.
14 Id. at 544-45, 64 N.E. at 443.
" Id. at 544, 64 N.E. at 443.
N Id. at 547, 64 N.E. at 444.
17 Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447. The court asserted that the legislature was the appropriate
forum for a movement toward the recognition of privacy rights. Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
The court's suggestion was acted upon shortly thereafter. See infra note 48 and accompany-
ing text (New York's statutory response to Roberson).
The Roberson decision almost immediately was interpreted as a total rejection of the
notion of an independent common-law right to privacy. See Owen v. Partridge, 40 Misc. 415,
420, 82 N.Y.S. 248, 252 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1903) ("After some vacillation.., our Court
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From Roberson onward, the New York courts have firmly re-
fused to recognize a common-law right to privacy despite succes-
sive waves of political, social and economic changes that have
raised threats to privacy of a magnitude Warren and Brandeis
hardly could have imagined 100 years ago.18 In their refusal to join
the majority of jurisdictions19 that have heeded Warren and Bran-
deis's call to utilize the common law "in its eternal youth" 0 in rec-
ognizing an individual's right simply to be left alone, the New York
courts have continued to rely on Roberson.2
of Appeals has finally repudiated the doctrine that the right of privacy has any existence in
law or is enforceable in equity").
The Roberson court was deeply divided, reaching its decision by a four-to-three vote.
Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 566, 64 N.E. at 451. In a strong dissent, Judge Gray argued that the
absence of precedent should not preclude equitable relief where there is an alleged invasion
of privacy. Id. at 561, 64 N.E. at 449 (Gray, J., dissenting). Judge Gray continued:
In the social evolution, with the march of the arts and sciences and in the
resultant effects upon organized society, it is quite intelligible that new conditions
must arise in personal relations, which the rules of the common law, cast in the
rigid mould of an earlier social status, were not designed to meet. It would be a
reproach to equitable jurisprudence, if equity were powerless to extend the appli-
cation of the principles of common law, or of natural justice, in remedying a
wrong, which, in the progress of civilization, has been made possible as the result
of new social, or commercial conditions.
Id. at 561-62, 64 N.E. at 449 (Gray, J., dissenting).
1" See M. MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 7-9 (1972) (technological advances have radically
altered status quo in favor of intrusive forces so that "personal privacy is jeopardized today
as never before"); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 963 (1964) ("scientific and technological advances have
raised the spectre of new and frightening invasions of privacy"); Note, Privacy, Computers,
and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1395, 1395
(1987) (the "information age" threatens individual privacy in ways unimaginable 100 years
ago).
There are several comprehensive works discussing some of these new threats to privacy.
See, e.g., Grenier, Computers and Privacy: A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 1970 DUKE L.J.
495, 495-505 (1970) (computer-imposed threat to individual privacy); Smith, We've Got
Your Number! (Is it Constitutional to Give it Out?): Caller Identification Technology & the
Right to Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA L. REv. 145 passim (1989) (technology capable of
identifying party placing calls to another's telephones); Note, AIDS: A Crisis in Confidenti-
ality, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1701, 1701, 1710-32 (1989) (conflict between individual privacy
rights and public health need to identify HIV carriers); Note, Workers, Drinks, and Drugs:
Can Employers Test?, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 127, 128-34 (1986) (privacy issues involved in use
of employee drug and alcohol testing).
10 See J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6.9[A], at 6-54.3 (recognizing that New York is
"part of a tiny and dwindling minority of [jurisdictions] which still rejects any common law
rights of privacy"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 117, at 851 (privacy rights recog-
nized in most jurisdictions, but exist only in limited form by statute in New York).
20 Warren & Brandeis, Privacy, supra note 2, at 193.
21 See Delan by Delan v. CBS, Inc., 91 App. Div. 2d 255, 258, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 612 (2d
Dep't 1983); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 140 Misc. 2d 770, 773, 531 N.Y.S.2d 735,
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The unacceptable consequences of the New York courts' reluc-
tance to discard the dated analysis of Roberson and failure to em-
brace a more expansive view of privacy rights was forcefully illus-
trated recently in Hurwitz v. United States.22 In Hurwitz, the
Second Circuit addressed a claim of invasion of privacy stemming
from a covert Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") operation,
through which the agency, over a period spanning three decades,
intercepted, analyzed and retained copies of more than 200,000 let-
ters mailed between the United States and the Soviet Union. 3
Among the intercepted letters was one Leo Hurwitz had written in
1963.24 Hurwitz was unaware of the interception until fourteen
years later when, pursuant to an unrelated request for access to his
CIA files, he discovered a copy of the letter.2 5 Hurwitz subse-
quently commenced an action against the CIA under the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").26 Under the FTCA, Hurwitz was enti-
tled to relief only if the federal government would be liable, if it
were a private party, under the laws of the state in which the al-
leged tortious conduct occurred. The Second Circuit, then, was
738 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1988), aff'd, 151 App. Div. 2d 1033, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (4th
Dep't 1989); Welch v. Group W. Prods., 138 Misc. 2d 856, 859, 525 N.Y.S.2d 466, 468 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1987).
22 884 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990).
13 Id. at 685; FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERA-
TIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 571
(1976) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. The operation, conceived at the height of the Cold War
in 1952, was designed to identify persons within the United States who were cooperating
with Soviet intelligence agencies. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1975) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER REPORT]. The
operation developed a computer list of 1.5 million names, including those of Senator Frank
Church and author John Steinbeck. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 971
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978). The CIA was
aware during the lifetime of the operation that the covert operation would be viewed as a
violation of federal laws prohibiting the obstruction or delay of the mails. ROCKEFELLER RE-
PORT, supra. As a result, the operation was terminated in 1973 when a senior postal official
refused to permit its continuance without high-level approval. Id.; ROCKEFELLER REPORT,
supra, at 101-15; SENATE REPORT, supra, at 561-636.
24 Hurwitz, 884 F.2d at 685.
26 Id.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
27 Id. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the federal government will waive its
immunity to liability in civil actions based on:
[Ilnjury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
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left to determine the status of Hurwitz's privacy rights under New
York law-a question the court had addressed under identical cir-
cumstances, but with dramatically different results, eleven years
earlier in Birnbaum v. United States.25
In Birnbaum, three plaintiffs brought suit against the CIA for
invasion of privacy based on the same covert operation that gave
rise to the claim in Hurwitz.29 In surveying the state of privacy
rights in New York, the Second Circuit acknowledged Roberson
but concluded that the decision neither expressly nor impliedly
precluded a cause of action for invasion of privacy by intrusive
means.30 The Birnbaum court further noted that the sanctity of an
individual's right to seclusion free from unreasonable intrusions
has been widely respected, if not judicially recognized, since before
the American Revolution.31 In finding for the plaintiffs, Judge
Gurfein wrote, "[iln the light of the current jurisprudence, it is
hard to believe that the New York Court of Appeals today would
apply the rationale of the 1902 Roberson decision to bar an action
based on intrusion upon privacy. 3 2
Id.
Hurwitz does not expressly indicate why New York law was applied. See Hurwitz, 884
F.2d at 686-87. In an earlier Second Circuit decision stemming from the same CIA opera-
tion, however, New York law was applied because the mail in question was intercepted at
John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. See Birnbaum, 436 F. Supp. at 976.
The mail monitoring at issue in Hurwitz was part of the so-called "East Coast" phase of the
covert operation in which the mail actually was scanned in New York. ROCKEFELLER RE-
PORT, supra note 23, at 105.
28 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
2 Id. at 321.
20 Id. at 323. The court noted the "manifold nature" of privacy rights as outlined by
Prosser. Id.; see supra note 1 (discussing Prosser's view that violation of right to privacy
may be one of four distinct torts).
21 Birnbaum, 588 F.2d at 323-25.
12 Id. at 325 (footnote omitted). The court acknowledged that its role was to "ascer-
tain" state law, not depart from it, in determining whether the federal government would be
liable if it were a private party. Id. But the court continued:
[W]e are also aware that '[law does change with times and circumstances,
and not merely through legislative reforms.... A refusal to accept a perceptible
trend may be as much a failure to follow state law as a refusal to apply existing
precedent because it is somewhat ambiguous.
Id. at 325-26 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 209 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
This optimistic view regarding the status of privacy rights in New York is reflected in
other Second Circuit decisions. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 n.11 (2d Cir. 1973).
In Galella, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis was granted relief from the intrusive techniques of
a celebrity photographer under a state anti-harassment statute. Id. at 991-93. Although the
court did not have to decide whether New York law provided Onassis with a cause of action
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Eleven years later, however, the Hurwitz court found Judge
Gurfein's assessment of New York law untenable. 3 Writing for the
court, Judge Cardamone noted that despite the Birnbaum court's
optimistic view, the New York courts had continued to maintain
an unwavering allegiance to Roberson.,4 "Time has proved [the
Birnbaum] judgment wrong," Judge Cardamone wrote. "The com-
plaint in this case presents the same fact pattern as Birnbaum
[but] [t]his time we make no prophecy. '3 5 The court then pro-
ceeded to apply New York law as it undoubtedly stands to-
day-leaving Hurwitz, on the eve of the centennial of the right to
privacy, without recourse to a remedy for one of the most funda-
mentally offensive invasions of one's right to be let alone. 6
for privacy invasion, the court stated that if it had been required to do so, it would have
concluded that the New York Court of Appeals was likely to "modify or distinguish" Rober-
son. Id. at 995 n.12; see Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
("that the New York Court of Appeals would recognize an invasion of privacy cause of ac-
tion beyond the parameters of Roberson ... is not without precedent"); Socialist Workers
Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 463 F. Supp. 515, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (New
York law would recognize privacy rights of group subjected to intrusive FBI techniques).
" Hurwitz, 884 F.2d at 685. The Second Circuit had articulated this conclusion previ-
ously but, it is submitted, less emphatically and under circumstances less dramatic than the
juxtapositioning of nearly identical fact patterns in Hurwitz and Birnbaum. See Mack v.
United States, 814 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1987) (court stated that Birnbaum assessment of
future of privacy rights in New York had proved inaccurate in ruling against former FBI
agent who claimed his privacy rights were violated by mandatory urinalysis); Allen v. Na-
tional Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (recent New York decisions indi-
cate no shift in courts' traditional position on common-law right to privacy).
"' Hurwitz, 884 F.2d at 685. The court stated that the New York Court of Appeals had
"consistently reminded litigants" that a common-law right to privacy did not exist in New
York. Id. The court cited two post-Birnbaum decisions. See Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65
N.Y.2d 135, 140, 480 N.E.2d 349, 353, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (1985) ("We have in the past
recognized that, in this State, there is no common-law right of privacy"); Arrington v. New
York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982)
(court consistently has adhered to position that no common-law right to privacy exists in
New York), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983). However, neither the Freihofer nor Arring-
ton courts even acknowledged the Birnbaum prediction that the Roberson rationale would
eventually be rejected. But see MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 App. Div. 2d 482, 484, 446
N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 (4th Dep't 1982) (court denied right to privacy action but acknowledged
"current predictions" of a possible expansion of those rights under New York law) (citing
Birnbaum and Spock). No New York court has yet acknowledged that the Second Circuit,
in Hurwitz, retreated from the Birnbaum assessment.
Hurwitz, 884 F.2d at 685.
" Id. at 688. Some commentators assert that a plaintiff whose right to privacy has been
rejected by the New York courts may still have access to a remedy. See Comment, Privacy
Tort Law in New York: Some Existing Routes to Recovery, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 255, 264-71
(1982). Further, it has been suggested that a plaintiff victimized by an unreasonable intru-
sion may still recover under an implied action pursuant to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (Mc-
Kinney 1989) (anti-eavesdropping statute), N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1989)
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
This Note will suggest that New York's continued refusal to
recognize a common-law right to privacy is becoming increasingly
troublesome as the twenty-first century draws near and the threat
to individual privacy mounts with the emergence of new technolo-
gies capable of ever more intrusive applications. In addition, this
Note will assert that this refusal to recognize a right to privacy is
rendered all the more distressing by the fact that, despite the ex-
traordinary number of privacy-related cases that have filtered
through the New York courts, there is an undeniable paucity of
decisions in which the courts have satisfactorily explained the rea-
soning behind this continued refusal to embrace a right so funda-
mental to American society. Finally, this Note will suggest that
there are ways to provide substantial legal protection against the
more extreme forms of privacy invasion without, as the Roberson
court feared, doing violence to established principles of law.37
I. THE Roberson COURT'S THREE-PRONGED OBJECTION
Prior to reaching the New York Court of Appeals, Abigail
Roberson, as well as Warren and Brandeis's nascent concept of the
right to privacy, had found an ally in New York's lower courts.3
The trial court in Roberson, for example, concluded that, despite
the absence of precedent, to deny Roberson some form of relief
would "be a blot upon our boasted system of jurisprudence" and
would be "at war with the principles of justice and equity."3 9 In
affirming the decision, the Appellate Division found "no reason
why a person who ... interferes with the desire of another person
to be left alone, is to be any more regarded than the person inter-
fered with who is desirous to have his feelings protected."4 -
The Court of Appeals, however, identified three specific rea-
(anti-harassment provision), or in a tort action for emotional distress. Id. Additional reme-
dies include a cause of action in trespass, a private action under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1988)
(anti-electronic surveillance statute), or a cause of action pursuant to N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.30 (McKinney 1989) (prohibition on sending alarming or annoying communications).
See Greenawalt, New York's Right of Privacy-The Need for Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV.
159, 173-74 (1975). It is asserted, however, that a tort assaulting human dignity as directly
as does the intrusion form of privacy invasion warrants an independent remedy.
'7 Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 556, 64 N.E. at 451.
10 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 App. Div. 30, 71 N.Y.S. 876 (4th
Dep't 1901), rev'd, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 32 Misc. 344, 65 N.Y.S. 1109 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1900), rev'd, 171 N.Y. 538, 64
N.E. 442 (1902).
39 Roberson, 32 Misc. at 346-47, 65 N.Y.S. at 1110-11.
40 Roberson, 64 App. Div. at 34, 71 N.Y.S. at 879.
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sons for finding against Roberson and rejecting what it suggested
was the lower courts' excursion "far outside of the beaten paths of
both common law and equity."'41 Writing for a divided court,42
Judge Parker concluded that the absence of precedent was, indeed,
a formidable barrier to the recognition of such an untested legal
concept.43 Secondly, the court noted its fear that judicial recogni-
tion of a concept as amorphous as a right to privacy would precipi-
tate a flood of unwarranted and even absurd litigation.44 Thirdly,
the court alluded to the first amendment tensions inherent in per-
mitting individuals to proscribe that which may be written, pub-
lished or even spoken about them.45
Notwithstanding attempts to justify its rejection of Roberson's
claim, the court's refusal to grant relief to a plaintiff depicted as a
young innocent violated at the hands of unscrupulous business in-
terests sparked a swift and decidedly negative reaction.46 It was
precisely this "storm of public disapproval"4 that spawned the en-
actment of legislation that today, as embodied in New York Civil
"' Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 547, 64 N.E. at 444.
42 See supra note 17 (discussing dissenting opinion in four-to-three Roberson decision).
13 Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 545-47, 64 N.E. at 443-44.
" Id. at 544-45, 64 N.E. at 443.
" Id. at 544, 64 N.E. at 443.
46 See generally Savell, supra note 2, at 11-12 nn.52-53 (listing various periodicals and
law journals with articles criticizing Roberson).
A typical reaction from the popular press was that of The New York Times, which
described the Roberson decision as "amazing" and suggested that the outcome in such pri-
vacy cases would have been different had Judge Parker's daughter been in the victim's
shoes. See N.Y.,Times, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8, col. 3.
The response from the legal community also was harsh. The Georgia Supreme Court,
for example, virtually broadsided the Roberson court when it subsequently became the first
state court of last resort to adopt the notion of a common-law right to privacy. See Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 193-94, 50 S.E. 68, 77-79 (1905). The Pavesich
court suggested that the Roberson decision was the result of an "unconscious yielding to the
feeling of conservatism which naturally arises in the mind of a judge who faces a proposition
which is novel." Id. at 213, 50 S.E. at 78. The court stated that while perhaps understanda-
ble, such conservatism "should not go to the extent of refusing to recognize a right which
the instincts of nature prove to exist, and which nothing in judicial decision, legal history, or
writings upon the law can be called to demonstrate its nonexistence as a legal right." Id.
The widespread public outcry prompted a member of the Roberson majority to take the
unprecedented step of defending the decision in a law review article. See O'Brien, The
Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. Rev. 437 (1902). Judge O'Brien asserted that the negative
public reaction was due at least in part to an inaccurate perception of the court's decision.
Id. at 438. The judge argued that the right to privacy, while perhaps an attractive concept to
the minds of laypersons, was still "quite too fanciful for judicial recognition as a legal princi-
ple." Id. at 442.
47 Prosser, supra note 1, at 385.
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Rights Law sections 50-51, remains the sole source of privacy
rights under New York law. 8 Enacted less than one year after
Roberson and with Abigail Roberson's predicament clearly in
mind, the statute prohibited the unauthorized use of a person's
name, portrait or picture.5 0 The statute, however, was silent as to
the panoply of other circumstances in which an individual's pri-
vacy could be invaded." Although the statute could be interpreted
as a narrow response to Roberson's plight and not as the sole em-
bodiment of protected privacy rights,52 the New York courts con-
4' See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1990). Section 50, the penal arm of the statutory right to privacy, provides
that:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without hav-
ing first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her
parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Cw. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976).
Section 51 provides for a civil remedy and states, in relevant part:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for ad-
vertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained [as specified in section 50] ... may maintain an equitable action ...
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have know-
ingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden
or declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the jury, in its discretion,
may award exemplary damages.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
The statutes, which have not been significantly amended since their adoption, were the
first of their kind in the nation. See S. HOFSTADTER & G. HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 28.
"' See Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321,
449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982) (statute confined to circumstances akin to those in Roberson),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
1* See supra note 48 and accompanying text (quoting N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1990)).
51 See id. The statutory right to privacy guards against the invasion of privacy Prosser
defined as the unauthorized appropriation of another's name or likeness, but is silent as to
Prosser's remaining classifications of invasion by intrusion, disclosure of private facts and
portrayal of another in a false light. See supra note 1 (discussing Prosser's analysis of con-
cept of right of privacy).
02 See Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 162 n.13. One team of commentators suggested
that the legislature drafted the statutory right narrowly in the belief that the courts, if faced
with a more egregious claim of privacy invasion than the one presented in Roberson, would
move to embrace the broad concept of privacy rights and thus make more drastic legislative
action unnecessary. See Brooks & Rolfe, Interference With Privacy-In What Forms Might
It Be Actionable in Virginia?, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 487, 492 (1979). The authors conceded,
however, that the validity of such an argument is weakened by the fact that the legislature
has done nothing in light of the courts' refusal to recognize a common-law privacy right over
the last 90 years. See id. at n.21.
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sistently have limited privacy rights strictly to those encapsulated
in the statute.5 The result, ironically, has been that the legislative
action that in 1903 appeared to signal the dawning of a more en-
lightened age of privacy rights in New York is now a cornerstone of
the New York courts' ultra-restrictive view of those rights.5 4
Despite the questionable validity of their initial interpretation
of the intent behind the legislature's response to Roberson, the
New York courts have continued to apply the following boilerplate
rationale for dismissing claims that do not fall neatly within the
parameters of Civil Rights Law sections 50-51: There is no com-
mon-law right to privacy in New York and individual privacy
rights exist solely by virtue of the statute.5 5 Although a lively de-
bate over the proper scope of the concept of privacy unfolds
around them,56 some of the courts have barely masked their ennui
at having to reaffirm their opposition to any departure from Rober-
son. 57 As a result, although the New York courts have fielded as
many privacy cases as the courts of all the other states combined,58
the subtleties of the contemporary rationale behind this allegiance
11 See Flores v. Mosier Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 854, 196 N.Y.S.2d
975, 977 (1959) (right to be let alone rests solely in statute); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
304 N.Y. 354, 358, 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1952) (right of privacy exists solely by statute);
Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 217-18 (1933) (no
right to privacy except to limited extent provided by statute).
" See J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.4[A], at 1-16. "What had been envisioned...
as an innovative step eventually became a straitjacket locking New York law into the factual
pattern of the Roberson case. Today, New York law is still haunted by the face of the young
Abigail Roberson." Id.
55 See Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 140, 480 N.E.2d 349, 353, 490 N.Y.S.2d
735, 739 (1985); Simpson v. New York City Transit Auth., 112 App. Div. 2d 89, 90, 491
N.Y.S.2d 645, 646 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 1010, 489 N.E.2d 1298, 499 N.Y.S.2d 396
(1985); Delan by Delan v. CBS, Inc., 91 App. Div. 2d 255, 258, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 612 (2d
Dep't 1983); Novel v. Beacon Operating Corp., 86 App. Div. 2d 602, 602, 446 N.Y.S.2d 118,
118-19 (2d Dep't 1982); Kiss v. County of Putnam, 59 App. Div. 2d 773, 773, 398 N.Y.S.2d
729, 729 (2d Dep't 1977); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 140 Misc. 2d 770, 773, 531
N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1988), affd, 151 App. Div. 2d 1033, 542
N.Y.S.2d 96 (4th Dep't 1989); Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing, 138 Misc. 2d 256, 259, 522
N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987).
58 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 117, at 850 (host of writers have focused on
concept of privacy); G. TRUBOW, PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (1990).
" See Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379, 383, 472 N.E.2d 307, 308, 482
N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (1984) (reasoning that history of statutory right to privacy has been re-
cited before and need not be repeated); Welch v. Group W. Prod., 138 Misc. 2d 856, 859, 525
N.Y.S.2d 466, 468 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) (fact that no common-law right to privacy
exists is so well recognized that it requires no citation other than Roberson).
11 See J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6.9[A], at 6-55 (author estimates that New York
courts have generated as many as 200 reported privacy cases).
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
to a doctrine clearly out of step with the majority view remain
largely inaccessible.59
In a handful of decisions, however, the courts have tran-
scended the conventional boilerplate rationale to offer some insight
into the nature of the reservations that prevent them from endors-
ing even a modest expansion of privacy rights.6 0 It is asserted that
in each of these decisions, the Roberson court's emphasis on the
absence of precedent and its fears of opening the floodgates to liti-
gation have been eclipsed by a heightened emphasis on the third
prong of the analysis-the potential conflict between first amend-
ment and privacy rights.
In Waters v. Moore,"' for example, the plaintiff's claim that
his statutory privacy rights were violated by a motion picture that
included a character based on him was rejected by the Supreme
Court, Nassau County, on the grounds that the film had not used
the plaintiff's name or likeness as required under the statutes.2
More importantly, now-Chief Judge Wachtler explained the court's
decision, in part, by referring to the first amendment ramifications
of any decision to the contrary,63 when he wrote: "New York's pri-
vacy statute strikes a delicate balance between the free dissemina-
tion of ideas and individual privacy. The former is paramount. The
latter, though applied liberally to achieve its laudatory purpose, is
subordinate to the principle of a free press." '64
Judge Wachtler's emphasis on the third prong of the Roberson
analysis was echoed in Arrington v. New York Times Co.65 Arring-
ton, a successful, black financial analyst, claimed his statutory
right to privacy had been violated by the unauthorized use of his
photograph to illustrate a newspaper article suggesting that mem-
bers of the black middle class were becoming estranged from
lower-income blacks.6 The Court of Appeals rejected the claim on
" See id.
60 See Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 439-40, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321-
22, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943-44 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Cohen v. Herbal
Concepts, Inc., 100 App. Div. 2d 175, 185, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 432-33 (1st Dep't) (Asch, J.,
concurring), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984); Davis v. High
Soc'y Magazine, 90 App. Div. 2d 374, 381-82, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314-15 (2d Dep't 1982).
"1 70 Misc. 2d 372, 334 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
62 Id. at 375-77, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 433-34.
" Id. at 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
04 Id.
5 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146
(1983).
60 Id. at 437-38, 434 N.E.2d at 1320, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
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the grounds that the statutory right to privacy does not prohibit
the unauthorized use of one's photograph in connection with a
publication of public interest.67 Judge Fuchsberg wrote that a nar-
row application of the statutory right to privacy "has not been
without sensitivity to the potentially competing nature of the val-
ues the Legislature, on the one hand, served by protecting against
the invasion of privacy ... and, on the other, the values our State
and Federal Constitutions bespeak in the area of free speech and
free press." 8
It is submitted that this apparent narrowing of the focus of
the courts' objection to a broad concept of privacy rights to one
based primarily on first amendment concerns is entirely consistent
with the judicial trend over the past quarter-century toward bol-
stering first amendment protections even at the risk of subordinat-
ing certain rights of individuals.6 9 In addition, it is suggested that
the apparent diminution in importance of the remaining two
prongs of the Roberson analysis-fears of a torrent of litigation
and the lack of precedent-is consistent with post-Roberson New
York decisions in which such arguments have been dismissed as
inadequate grounds on which to decline to forge ahead into un-
67 Id. at 440, 434 N.E.2d at 1322, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
'8 Id.; see Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 100 App. Div. 2d 175, 185, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426,
433 (1st Dep't) (Asch, J., concurring) (primary rationale behind restrictive reading of statu-
tory right to privacy is potential for collision between free speech and privacy rights), aff'd,
63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984); Davis v. High Soc'y Magazine, 90
App. Div. 2d 374, 382, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (2d Dep't 1982) (conflicting tensions between
privacy rights and constitutional rights of free speech and press require careful delineation
of statutory right to privacy); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 80 Misc. 2d 531, 535, 363
N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (free press and speech transcend privacy rights),
aff'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352
N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
09 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring public
figure plaintiff to establish actual malice in libel suit, abolishing common-law rule that did
not adequately reflect nation's commitment to robust public debate); see also Hustler Mag-
azine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (magazine parody of public figure must be pro-
tected even if patently offensive to prevent chilling effect on open public debate); Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (plaintiff in libel suit bears burden
of proving falsity in interest of protecting free speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 348-50 (1974) (private figure plaintiff barred from recovering punitive damages in libel
action unless actual malice established).
It is important to note, however, the willingness of the United States Supreme Court to
expand the concept of the right to privacy when first amendment concerns are not at issue.
See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (possession of obscene material in
one's own home permissible, noting fundamental right to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusions on privacy).
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charted legal territory given sufficiently compelling circum-
stances.70
II. INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION: FILLING THE GAP
Invasion of another's privacy by intrusive means, such as ille-
gal wiretapping, excessive surveillance or, as in Hurwitz, illegal in-
terception of private correspondence, is perhaps the most offensive
of William Prosser's four species of privacy invasions.71 By violat-
ing the victim's seclusion, solitude or private affairs, these intrusive
acts constitute an assault on human dignity itself.72 The gravity of
such an intrusion did not elude Brandeis who, as a Supreme Court
Justice, wrote that the right to be free of intrusive governmental
forces was "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
cherished by civilized men. '7 3 Given the particularly repugnant na-
ture of the intrusion form of privacy invasion, the failure of the
New York courts to recognize an independent right to be free of
unreasonable intrusions may be the most glaring gap in New
York's extremely constricted view of privacy rights.7 4 It is submit-
ted, however, that this most glaring of shortcomings may, in fact,
be the least difficult to overcome.
The intrusion form of privacy invasion is free of the first
amendment ramifications inherent in the other forms of invasion
classified by Prosser as: the unauthorized appropriation of an-
other's name or likeness, disclosure of private facts concerning an-
other, and portrayal of another in a false light. 5 Since intrusion
upon one's seclusion occurs regardless of whether any information
70 See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing two prongs of Roberson
analysis).
71 See supra note 1 (discussion of Prosser's concept of four distinct forms of privacy
invasions).
72 See J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5.10[A], at 5-91; Bloustein, supra note 18, at
974. The intrusion is a "blow to human dignity, an assault on human personality." Id. A
man whose privacy has been intruded upon "is less of a man, has less human dignity...
[hie who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion
is a primary weapon of the tyrant." Id. at 973-74.
73 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Although the intrusion form of privacy invasion was not expressly discussed in the
landmark Warren and Brandeis law review article, it is submitted that the intrusion upon
another's seclusion was the epitome of the type of assault the authors railed against.
71 See Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 172.
7' See J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5.10[B], at 5-92; Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Pri-
vacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 937 (1968).
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gained from the act subsequently is disseminated, publication
clearly is not an element of the cause of action."0 Thus, a recogni-
tion by the New York courts of this urgently needed privacy pro-
tection would not implicate the first amendment concerns that fig-
ure so prominently in those few contemporary decisions in which
the courts have discussed their reservations about broadening pri-
vacy rights.77
In addition, it is asserted that a lack of precedent no longer
stands as a genuine impediment to a modest expansion of privacy
rights, such as one recognizing the intrusion-upon-seclusion form
of privacy invasion. The hard line the Roberson court maintained
on the absolute necessity of precedential authority clearly is at
odds with the more liberal pronouncements of the New York
courts that have abandoned the traditional reverence for precedent
in making important advancements in other areas of the law. 8
These courts have acknowledged that the doctrine of stare decisis
is not designed for rigid application and should be departed from
under sufficiently compelling circumstances. 9 It is submitted that
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1981). Intrusion "does not depend
upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs." Id. at
comment a.
" See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussion of first amendment con-
cerns expressed in New York decisions); see also Nimmer, supra note 75, at 957 ("Intrusion
does not raise first amendment difficulties since its perpetration does not involve speech or
other expression").
11 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 351, 102 N.E.2d 691, 692 (1951) (court rejected
traditional rule barring recovery for injuries negligently inflicted prior to birth). In Woods,
the primary rationale for the traditional rule was the lack of precedent. Id. at 353, 102
N.E.2d at 693. The court rejected this reasoning, noting that the common law had been
modified and updated in many other cases. Id. at 354, 102 N.E.2d at 694. The court noted
that "it had not only the right, but the duty to re-examine a question where justice demands
it." Id. (citing Rumsey v. New York & N.E.R.R. Co., 133 N.Y. 79, 85-86 (1892) and Klein v.
Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383 (1916)). If, the court stated, lack of precedent" 'were a valid objec-
tion, the common law would now be what it was in the Plantagenet period.' "Id. at 355, 102
N.E.2d at 694 (quoting Winfield, The Unborn Child, 4 U. TORONTO L.J. 278, 292 (1941-42));
see also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). Prior to taking his
position on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: "It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Id.
7' See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,
751 (1963) (mechanical application of precedent should be avoided if it would lead to unjust
or anomalous results); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3,
11 (1957) (long-standing precedent rejected because it was "out of tune with the life about
us, at variance with modern day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing"); Klein
v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 386, 114 N.E. 809, 811 (1916) (Cardozo, J.) (court considered it
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the near universal recognition of a common-law right to privacy,80
along with the growing threat of intrusion posed by technological
developments and other changes in recent decades, present the
New York courts with a sufficiently compelling scenario in which
to make at least a modest departure from Roberson.
Similarly, it is asserted that the fear of a potential flood of
litigation no longer can justify the refusal to recognize a common-
law right to be free of unreasonable intrusions upon one's privacy.
The New York courts, in addressing other areas of the law, have
recognized that if an individual has sustained an injury, the courts
have an obligation to consider that claim regardless of whether it
may be floating amid a sea of similar, though perhaps less worthy,
claims."1
Finally, it is suggested that a move to recognize the intrusion
form of privacy invasion would benefit from the New York Court
of Appeals' early exploration of the concept in Nader v. General
Motors Corp.2 In Nader, consumer advocate Ralph Nader claimed
that, in retaliation for his public criticisms of General Motors, the
automotive giant had invaded his privacy. rights under District of
Columbia law through the use of wiretaps, eavesdropping and
other intrusive tactics geared toward obtaining information that
might discredit him.83 Although the court was only required to de-
cide whether Nader had established a cause of action under Dis-
trict of Columbia law, 4 Chief Judge Fuld considered at length the
imperative to reconsider prior decision that stood in conflict with "uniform convictions of
the entire judiciary of the land").
1O See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1981). "[T]he existence of a right of
privacy is now recognized in the great majority of the American jurisdictions that have con-
sidered the question." Id. at comment a.
81 See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 230-31, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848-49, 473 N.Y.S.2d
357, 362-63 (1984) (court rejected floodgates argument to adopt zone-of-harm rule); Battalla
v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961) (dismissing
floodgates argument because it denies "a logical legal right and remedy in all cases because
in some a fictitious injury may be urged as a real one." (quoting Green v. T. A. Shoemaker &
Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1902))); Ferarra v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152
N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 (1958) (floodgates concerns are valid, but "[t]he
problem is one of adequate proof, and it is not necessary to deny a remedy in all cases
because some claims may be false").
82 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
83 Id. at 564-65, 255 N.E.2d at 767, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 650. District of Columbia law was
applied because Nader resided and most of the acts in question occurred in that jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 565, 255 N.E.2d at 767, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
84 Id. at 568, 255 N.E.2d at 769. 307 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
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"new and developing"' 5 legal concept of intrusion-upon-seclusion
before concluding that some acts Nader had complained of consti-
tuted an invasion of privacy.8 6 Judge Fuld's opinion was widely
viewed as an attempt to establish an inroad for the eventual broad-
ening of privacy rights in New York."7 While the New York courts
have resisted such a move, it is suggested that Judge Fuld's analy-
sis, which remains in harmony with the contemporary view of pri-
vacy, provides an appropriate point of departure from which the
courts could reappraise at least some aspects of privacy rights, par-
ticularly the right to be free from unreasonable intrusions upon
one's solitude, seclusion and private affairs.
It is noted that nothing would prevent the New York courts
from departing from Roberson in an incremental fashion."8 In de-
lineating the scope of the right to privacy, Prosser stressed that his
four species of privacy invasions were in fact independent torts
with nothing in common other than that each constituted a general
interference with another's right to be left alone." In light of the
New York courts' emphatic position on the supremacy of first
amendment rights over privacy rights, it is suggested that the most
pragmatic approach to securing a broadening of privacy rights in
New York may be to press for recognition of the narrow-but, by
virtue of its freedom from first amendment complications, more ju-
dicially palatable-right to be free of unreasonable intrusions.
Holding out for a sweeping recognition of privacy rights is likely to
result in the continued denial of any expansion of those rights.
Recognition of a right to be free of unreasonable intrusions, on the
other hand, is a more conservative and, jurisprudentially, more
consistent step for the courts to take and therefore one more likely
to be forthcoming.90
I /d.
88 Id. at 567-71, 255 N.E.2d at 769-71, 307 N.Y.S.2d 652-56.
'7 See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afi'd in part and rev'd
in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Brooks & Rolfe, supra note 52, at 494; O'Hara & Wolff,
Torts, 1970 Survey of New York Law, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 423, 438 (1971); Note, Unneces-
sary Analysis of Elements of a Right to Privacy by Court of Appeals: A Possible Basis for
Extension of the Tort in New York?, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 507, 508 (1970).
Judge Breitel was critical of Chief Judge Fuld's decision to expound on an issue not
directly before the court. See Nader, 25 N.Y.2d at 571, 255 N.E.2d at 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at
656 (Breitel, J., concurring).
88 See J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6.3[B], at 6-16 (chart of various state privacy
statutes, showing which of the four distinct torts each state has adopted).
89 See Prosser, supra note 1, at 389.
90 It is submitted that the above analysis also could be applied to the argument favor-
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CONCLUSION
The reluctance of the New York courts.to recognize a com-
mon-law right to privacy, while of questionable wisdom when first
pronounced nearly ninety years ago in Roberson, is today clearly at
odds with contemporary jurisprudence and the exigencies of mod-
ern society. The incongruity of the New York position is most ap-
parent in the courts' refusal to use the common law to guard
against the intrusion-upon-seclusion form of privacy invasion at a
time when emerging technologies present a threat to privacy so
profound as to make the CIA's intrusive techniques in Hurwitz ap-
pear more crude than stealthy, and the matters that so exercised
Warren and Brandeis a century ago appear more like commonplace
annoyances than substantial invasions of one's right to be let
alone. While recognition of the broad spectrum of privacy rights is
complicated by legitimate and perhaps insuperable first amend-
ment concerns, there is no genuine obstacle to the recognition of
an individual's right to be free of unreasonably intrusive assaults
upon his seclusion, solitude and private affairs. The dehumanizing
effects of such intrusions are only exacerbated by the failure of the
New York courts to confront this most egregious of privacy inva-
ing legislative initiatives in broadening privacy rights in New York. Some commentators
suggest that legislative action is the only likely means of achieving an expansion of privacy
rights in New York. See Savell, supra note 2, at 2 n.4; Comment, Torts-Civil Rights-The
Right of Privacy Under the New York Statute, 4 N.Y.L.F. 229, 233 (1958). Unlike the cir-
cumstances facing the legislature at the turn of the century when it enacted the nation's
first statutory right to privacy, the legislature today would not be testing unchartered legal
terrain should it decide to press ahead in recognizing even a modest expansion of those
rights. The legislature would benefit from the experience of those states that have recog-
nized the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort in their privacy statutes. See J.T. McCARTHY, supra
note 2, § 6.3[B], at 6-16. More importantly, the legislature already has a proposed draft of
an expanded privacy statute submitted 15 years ago by the New York Law Review Commis-
sion but never enacted. See N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 26, 29, 43, 56 (1978); Leg. Doc.
(1976) No. 65D accompanying 1976 Senate Bill No. 7693 and 1976 Assembly Bill No. 10351;
Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 162-65 (author of report used in drafting proposal discusses
proposed expansion of statutory privacy right). The Commission proposed that the state's
narrow statutory right be expanded to recognize a virtually open-ended tort under which an
individual would be entitled to relief for "highly offensive" invasions of his privacy. See
Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 162-65. A narrowing of the proposed legislation to focus on
adding only the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort would conflict with the Commission's desire to
maintain a level of generality so as not to preclude future expansions of the right. See id. at
186. It is asserted, however, that a call for such modest expansion of privacy rights is more
likely to meet with success in the legislature than a more open-ended proposal, for the same
reasons suggested above with respect to the judiciary.
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sions and provide the public with the legal safeguards it not only
deserves but, increasingly, needs.
William S. Gyves
